In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War-the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program. Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers.
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Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. Three factors largely account for this problem. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Your browser does not support the audio element. Listen to Aaron David Miller, Eugene Rumer, and Richard Sokolsky discuss the importance of getting Russia right for U.S.
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